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Central Asia has always been a very important region. Already in the time 
of Alexander the Great the most important trade routes between Europe 
and Asia run through this region. This importance kept strengthening with 
the development of the trade which was particularly connected with the 
famous Silk Road. Cities through which this trade artery runs through were 
experiencing a real boom in the late Middle Ages and in the Early modern 
period. Over the wealth of the business oases of Khiva and Bukhara rose 
Samarkand, the capital city of the empire of the last Great Mongol conqueror 
Timur Lenk (Tamerlane).2
The golden age of the Silk Road did not last forever. The overseas 
discoveries and the rapid development of the transoceanic sailing was gradually 
weakening the influence of this ancient trade route and thus lessening the 
importance and wealth of the cities and areas it run through. The profits of the 
East India companies were so huge that it paid off for them to protect their 
business territories. In the name of the trade protection began also the political 
penetration of the European powers into the overseas areas and empires began 
to emerge.
1 This article was created under project British-Afghan relations in 19th century which is dealt 
with in 2014 at Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague with funds from Charles 
University Grant Agency.
2 See B. F. MANZ, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, Cambridge 1989, p. 58.
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Britain gradually turned out to be the most successful power. It gained 
the crucial influence in the New World through the Seven Years’ War and by 
the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century it strengthened its 
position in India as well. The wealthy Indian subcontinent quickly became one 
of the jewels of the Empire. This fact logically led to the effort to protect this 
jewel as efficiently as possible. Britain’s dominance over the seas of the world 
was in the 19th century very strong, a naval expansion to India was therefore 
very unlikely. After all, the Europeans were the first who invaded India from 
the sea. The Aryans around 1500 BC, Tamerlane at the end of the 14th century, 
the Mughals a century later and also the Afghans in the second half of the 18th 
century came to India from Central Asia.
The network of the passes intersecting the Solomon Mountains and the 
Hindu Kush allowed for these raids. In particular, the Khyber and the Bolan 
Pass were in this respect strategically very important, here we can also see 
the origins of the British interest in very poor but combative Afghanistan. 
Britain, however, was not the only one that saw Central Asia as an area of 
a great strategic importance. The Russians, since the age of Peter the Great, 
were making plans to take control over the rich oases of Central Asia. The 
expedition to Khiva in 1717,3 however, ended up as a disaster and other efforts 
had to be postponed for another 100 years.
Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia gained such a strong 
position that it could begin to pursue the old dreams of its greatest Tsar. In 
the first half of the century Russia was still struggling with its own internal 
problems, but managed to expand its influence, especially into the steppes 
of contemporary Kazakhstan. Russia’s advance to Central Asia became more 
powerful in the second half of the century. The Crimean War showed the Tsar 
how vulnerable is his empire in case of a maritime conflict. It was therefore 
necessary to find an area where the Western powers could not use their 
supremacy over the sea. Moreover, the Russians were aware of the importance 
3 S. BECKER, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, Bukhara and Khiva, 1866–1924, New 
York 2004, p. 9.
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of India for Britain since India was the pearl of the British Empire; therefore 
it was quite logical that the Russians turned their attention there. As it was 
shown already in the first half of the century, the Indus River is not very easily 
navigable for the merchant vessels, let alone the naval fleet, therefore every 
military conflict in Central Asia was purely inland.
Already by the end of the 1830s and at the beginning of the 1840s, 
Russia ascertained that the British are willing to wage war in Central Asia for 
their interests, and that it is definitely not an easy thing for them. The First 
Anglo-Afghan War between 1839 and 1842 ended as a complete disaster.4 The 
British tried to appoint to the Afghan throne a ruler who would be willing to 
serve their interests. Despite the fact that he was a man seemingly perfectly 
suited for such a task. He was from an ancient family whose founder won the 
independence for the country. Nevertheless, he was unable to keep the throne 
without the British help. The support from the insular empire lasted only for 
two years, the financial problems of India and a large uprising in November 
1841 caused one of the biggest disasters in the British imperial history. During 
the attempt of the British troops to retreat to India, over 6,000 soldiers and 
10,000 civilians were killed. Just a few hostages and one doctor arrived from 
Kabul to their destination, the city of Jalalabad.5
Although the revenge that followed according to the words of the 
Governor-General Lord Ellenborough Britain’s “military character war 
re-established,”6 however not even the re-conquering of Afghanistan and 
the inferno of famous bazaar could in Kabul not erase the cruel defeat of 
the previous months. After the final departure of the British, the emir Dost 
Muhammad Khan returned to the throne; his removal was actually the main 
goal of the three years’ war effort. The disaster of the First Anglo-Afghan War 
4 See A. FORBES, The Afghan Wars 1838–1842 and 1878–1880, London 1892; J. W. KAYE, 
History of the War in Afghanistan, 2 Vols., London 1857; J. A. NORRIS, The First Afghan 
War 1838–1842, Cambridge 1967.
5 See V. EYRE, The Military Operations at Cabul Which Ended in Retreat and Destruction of 
British Army, London 1843.
6 NORRIS, p. 401.
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was for the next 30 years present in the minds of most men who were deciding 
about the direction of the British policy in India.
One of the causes of the first war in Afghanistan was also the concern 
of the Russian advance into Central Asia. In the 1860s and 1870s these 
concerns became a reality. Only nine years after the end of the Crimean War, 
the Russians appeared at the borders of the Khanate of Khiva and the Bukhara 
Emirate. In 1865 they took control over Shymkent, the following year of 
Samarkand and in 1873 they even gained control over the foreign policy of 
Bukhara and Khiva. In this way strictly speaking was created a direct border 
between Afghanistan and the Russian Empire.7
This fact concerned Britain very much. The Russian advance in 
Central Asia was making the authors of the British foreign policy worried 
for a longer time. Thus a very heated discussion over the way how India 
should be defended was taking place. Two blocs of different opinions were 
created: the Sindhi School and the Punjabi School. The Punjabi School 
included the Governors-General and the Viceroys of India Lord Lawrence, 
May or Northbrook and a large part of the Whig party; the Sindhi School 
included the expert on Central Asia, Henry Rawlinson, or the Governors of 
the British province of Sindh, James Jacob, James Green, and most of the 
Conservatives.
The Sindhi School promoted a more proactive approach, the so-called 
forward policy. According to its representatives it was necessary to move the 
border of India beyond the Indus River, control the entrance to the strategically 
important mountain passes, especially the Khyber, Bolan and Shutagardan 
passes. On that occasion, Afghanistan was to be politically controlled and its 
foreign policy should have remained under the control of Britain. There were 
also extreme opinions expressing the need to move the borders of India to the 
Amu Darya and thus control the whole Afghanistan.8
7 See BECKER, pp. 58–61.
8 Governor of Sindh John Jacob to Governor General of India Lord Canning, 1856. 
Parliamentary Papers (PP), C. 73: Central Asia and Quetta: Copies of Despatches from the 
wbhr 01|2014
65
The Punjabi School was on the other hand trying to press a moderate 
approach. Managing good and peace relations with Afghanistan, interfering 
in its affairs as little as possible and using it as a kind of a buffer state whose 
stability and prosperity consequently ensure the safety of India.9
We may state that since 1855, when Britain re-established diplomatic 
relations with Afghanistan and especially after the large Indian uprising 
during which Afghanistan remained neutral, the Governors-General stuck 
with the policy of the Punjabi school. The old-new emir Dost Muhammad 
Khan was never stubbornly anti-British, even when he was exiled from his 
own country, thus he did not become repulsive and through the alliance with 
the hitherto enemy he also gained a lot. Afghanistan was since the death of its 
founder in 1773 gradually weakened by its internal disputes. Dost Muhammad 
Khan was the first ruler since the death of the great Emir and unifier Ahmad 
Shah Durrani who again gained direct control over the three largest and most 
important cities of the country: Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. All this with the 
tacit support from Great Britain.
Dost Muhammad Khan already before his death in 1863 advised the Indian 
Governors-General and Viceroys to interfere in Afghan affairs as little as possible. 
The British followed his advice perhaps too much. Dost Muhammad Khan left 
behind a unified, but not very cohesive country. Moreover, as his heir he appointed 
a man who was only his third oldest son. The Civil War might have started anyway, 
but not even the personality profile of the new Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, was 
convenient for a peace settlement. The Emir expected that the taking over the 
power would be smooth and that the British would support his claim to the throne. 
Both of these assumptions turned out to be wrong. Even though Sher Ali ruled for 
the first two years without bigger problems, however since 1864 his elder brothers 
began to claim their right to the throne.
Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State, Dated 23 January 1867, no. 
15; 8 February 1867, No. 28; 23 February 1867, No. 42; and 23 October 1867, No. 162, with 
Minutes Enclosed, on Central Asia and Quetta; and, of the Reply of the Secretary of State, 
Dated 26 December 1867, London 1879, Encl. 3, No. 1, p. 7.
9 B. SMITH, Life of Lord Lawrence, Vol. 1, London 1883, pp. 504–507.
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These were Muhammad Afzal Khan, the Governor of the Afghan 
Turkestan, and Muhammad Amin Khan, the Governor of the Kandahar 
region. Sher Ali and his army fought with his brothers and even though he 
managed to defeat them, in one of the battles he lost his eldest son and heir. 
Sher Ali this was very affected by this and for several months he lost interest 
in any political activity and began to drown in depression. Muhammad Afzal 
Khan took advantage of this situation and occupied Kabul. Afzal, however, 
shortly after that died and his son ascended the throne. Sher Ali, in the 
meantime, recovered and with the help of his sons and the general uprising 
in Kabul in autumn 1868 he again took over the city and returned to the 
throne. 10
Great Britain kept aloof during the civil war in Afghanistan. At that time 
Lord Lawrence was the Governor-General of India and he was the biggest 
supporter of the approach of Punjabi school, i.e. of the policy of masterly 
inactivity. Lawrence was convinced that by this approach he followed the 
instructions given to him by Dost Muhammad Khan before he died,11 however, 
Sher Ali, had a different opinion. He repeatedly asked Britain for the support 
of his indisputable claims as the heir of their ally Dost Muhammad Khan. 
Lord Lawrence’s acts were quite puzzling.
When Afzal Khan ascended to the throne, he immediately sent him a 
congratulatory letter, this led to conviction of Sher Ali that the British stand 
against him and his interests. He apparently had this feeling for the rest of his 
reign in Afghanistan and it may be regarded as one of the main causes of the 
later conflict. For a person who is less emotional and thinks more rationally 
this fact may not play such a role, but as it was proved many times, Sher Ali 
never again trusted the British and he showed that to them at maybe the least 
appropriate time.
10 See M. S. KHAN, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, Vol. 1, London 1900, 
pp. 62–144.
11 H. B. HANNA, The Second Afghan War, Its Causes, Its conduct and Its Consequences, 
Westminster 1899, Vol. 1, p. 8.
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In spite of it, the British at the beginning of the 1870s were trying to 
improve the relations with Afghanistan, especially with respect to the Russian 
threat coming from the North, they could not hesitate. After Lord Lawrence, 
Lord Mayo succeeded to the office of the Governor-General and the Viceroy 
of India. Immediately after his arrival in Calcutta he suggested to Sher Ali 
a meeting in Ambala in Punjabi. The meeting of the two men took place on 
March 27, 1869. The result of it was a vague declaration stating that “British 
Government has no desire of aggrandisement and extension of territory, it 
will still use its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are 
earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions strong, independent 
and friendly government.”12 Lord Mayo showed throughout the whole 
negotiation that Britain is willing to cooperate with Afghanistan, but taking 
into consideration his instructions from London, he could not offer to the Emir 
any form of a long-term and official cooperation.
In a letter dated on March 30, 1869, he wrote that Britain “will view with 
severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb position 
as Ruler of Cabool and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from 
time to time, by such means as circumstances may require to strengthen the 
Government of Your Highness”.13 Although in London this formulation was 
considered as too bold, Mayo defended it in several extensive letters arguing 
that the Emir clearly recognized the limits of the help Britain is willing to 
provide and if Britain wanted to keep him as an ally; it had to somehow show 
that the alliance with Afghanistan is important for Britain.
It can be said that in the following years, the relations between Britain and 
Afghanistan became very complicated. In 1873 organized the new Governor-
General and Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, a negotiation at the summer 
residence of the British government in India, in Simla. Problems appeared 
12 Indian Government to Lord Argyll, 3rd April 1869. PP, C. 2190: Afghanistan: Correspondence 
Respecting the Relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan since the 
Accesion of the Amir Shere Ali Khan, London 1879, No. 17, No. A1, p. 89.
13 Lord Mayo to Sher Ali, 31st March 1869. Ibidem, No. 17, Encl. 3, p. 90.
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already before the meeting took place. Lord Northbrook actually planned to 
send his envoys to Kabul and negotiate there, but the Emir refused and sent 
his representative, Noor Muhammad Khan, to negotiate with the British on 
the Indian ground. The Emir had further objections against the British policy. 
In the previous years the Russian-British negotiations on the northern border 
of Afghanistan took place and the Emir was very offended by the fact that he 
could not attend these negotiations. Likewise, he was not very pleased with 
the British decision regarding the Afghan-Persian dispute over a part of the 
Seistan province which took place at the end of 1872.
Therefore it is not surprising that the negotiations did not proceed 
smoothly at all. Noor Muhammad Khan was requesting from the British a 
stronger guarantee of not violating the northern border, which was agreed 
on with Russia, or possibly a promise of military aid in case that Russia 
would want to jeopardize its independence. Lord Northbrook of course 
could not offer any of it, he had to resign himself to the diplomatic and 
limited material help and an assurance that Russia plans no expansion 
southward into Central Asia since Afghanistan is completely outside of its 
sphere of influence.
Despite these disagreements the negotiations still proceeded in a relatively 
friendly spirit. That was about to change soon. In 1874, Benjamin Disraeli’s 
Conservative government acceded to power. Lord Salisbury, later the prime 
minister, became the Minister for India. His approach to the foreign policy in 
“the jewel of the Empire” was diametrically different from the direction that 
the Whig governments followed. Salisbury was an avowed supporter of the 
so-called Sindhi School’s approach to the defence of India. As for opinions, 
he chimed in with the former Governor of Bombay and influential theorist of 
the Sindhi School, Bartle Frere. From his point of view, for the defence were 
strategically especially important the area of the Bolan Pass and the city of 
Quetta. They should become some sort of an advanced point that would allow 
Britain to respond quickly to any development in Afghanistan and quickly 
prepare for the possible threat that could come from Kabul or the Khyber 
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Pass. For this purpose Frere championed the placement of the British envoys 
in Herat, Kandahar and Kabul.14
However, it was a Whig, Lord Northbrook, who remained the Governor-
General and Viceroy of India for the following two years after the new 
Conservative government came into power. These years were thus in the spirit 
of the long correspondence discussions between the Governor-General and 
the Secretary of State for India. Lord Salisbury, for example, instructed the 
Government of India to send a short-term diplomatic mission to Kabul, in case 
of a refusal a pressure should be exerted on the Emir to admit the mission. 
Lord Northbrook opposed this act, objected it very much and considered 
the pressure on the Emir as a “fatal error”.15 In 1875 Northbrook turned 
his disapproval into action and resigned his post.16 He was succeeded by a 
diplomat who had experience from major European courts but no knowledge 
of the Indian environment. This fact was not unusual, most of the Governors-
General were chosen among the men who had no previous experience with 
the Indian government. His name was Robert Buller-Lytton, the first Earl of 
Lytton.17
The new Viceroy received the instructions from the Government in 
London before the long journey to India. Lytton should have started to fully 
tackle the task Northbrook was so reluctant to fulfil: sending a temporary 
diplomatic mission to Kabul and convince the Emir here to let Britain establish 
a permanent envoy in Kabul. Until then there was only a vakil, a native who 
carried out some of the envoy’s duties. Salisbury however did not trust this 
model and immediately after taking the place of the Secretary of State for India 
he wanted to replace the current vakil and establish any form of a permanent 
representation in Afghanistan as soon as possible.18
14 K. D. GHOSE, England and Afghanistan, a Phase in Their Relations, Calcutta 1960, p. 12.
15 Northbrook to Salisbury 28th January 1876. PP, C. 2190, No. 34, pp. 149–155.
16 A. H. BILGRAMI, Afghanistan and British India 1793–1907, New Delhi 1973, p. 168.
17 See B. BALFOUR, The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 1876 to 1880: 
Compiled from Letters and Official Papers, London 1899, pp. 1–4.
18 Lord Salisbury to Lord Lytton, 28th February 1876. PP, C. 2190, No. 35, Encl. 1, p. 156.
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The vision of the Conservative Government was to strengthen Afghanistan’s 
power and use its mountainous surface as natural barrier against any military 
action against India. The Conservatives were willing to offer Afghanistan much 
more than the previous Whig government, but it demanded bigger concessions 
from Afghanistan for these services. They wanted to have a significant influence 
on its foreign policy and a good overview of its domestic policy.19
The first cracks in the Conservatives’ plan began to appear almost 
immediately. The Afghan Emir, Sher Ali, refused the proposed meeting. He 
explained his attitude by three facts: 1) he cannot guarantee the safety of the 
envoys; 2) he is afraid that the mission could raise demands that he could not 
meet and this would worsen the relations between Britain and Afghanistan, 
and 3) that the admission of the British mission would force the Emir to admit 
the Russian mission as well.20 Lord Lytton was very displeased with the Emir’s 
answers and responded to it with expressing an opinion that if the Emir refuses 
a “hand of friendship” it will compel him to “regard Afghanistan as a State 
which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of British 
Government”.21 The sting of a threat is quite obvious here.
Nonetheless, we cannot say that there was no possible chance of mending 
the good relations. Neither Sher Ali nor Lord Lytton for now openly thought 
about anything else than the friendly coexistence of both countries. Eventually 
a meeting was arranged in Peshawar where the representatives of both 
countries arrived. Afghanistan’s negotiator’s role was carried out by a long-
time mentor and to the British very well-known negotiator, Noor Muhammad 
Khan. The Indian Governor General and Viceroy was represented by Lewis 
Pelly. The negotiations were, however, since the beginning affected by the 
misunderstandings that preceded their call. The British side had misinterpreted 
the acceptance of the offer to meet as consent to send a diplomatic mission of 
19 BALFOUR, pp. 29–30.
20 Atta Muhammad to Sir Richard Pollock, 21st December 1876. PP, C. 2190, No. 36, Encl. 
32, p. 194.
21 Commissioner of Peshawar to the Emir of Cabul, 8th July 1876. Ibidem, No. 36, Encl. 9, p. 177.
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the insular empire to Kabul. At the beginning of the negotiations they were thus 
very unpleasantly surprised that Noor Muhammad Khan not only did not take 
this thing as an already decided one, but that he did not even want to negotiate 
about it.22 The British throughout whole the negotiation unsuccessfully tried to 
convince the Afghans that without this concession it was not possible to reach 
any consensus on other points.
When later on during the conference in Peshawar Noor Muhammad 
Khan died,23 the British decided to close the meeting and Lord Lytton began 
to look more intensively for other than diplomatic solutions. At that point 
also another important player of the Great Game, the Tsarist Russia asked to 
speak. Since the beginning of the 1870s, a correspondence took place between 
the Russian Governor of the Orenburg region and the Afghan Emir. Most of 
the time it was consulted with the British vakil and thus did not pose any 
huge danger to the insular empire. The Russian-British relations, however, 
during that time significantly worsened. Especially with respect to the Russian 
expansion into the Ottoman Empire, the Tsar decided to take advantage of 
the disagreements between Britain and Afghanistan in Central Asia and the 
Russian authorities in the region increased their activity.
In reality this resulted in sending general Stoletov’s diplomatic mission 
to Kabul.24 The Russians proceeded significantly more resolutely. The mission 
was sent without any negotiation and the Emir was presented with a fait 
accompli. The British responded to the reports about Stoletov’s action in the 
Afghan capital city almost immediately by setting up their own mission.25 
At the same time a new vakil was sent to Kabul to inform the Emir about 
22 Report from the first meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Noor Muhammad Khan, 30th 
January 1877. PP, C. 2190, No. 36, Encl. 35, p. 196.
23 BILGRAMI, p. 184.
24 Governor-General of Russian Turkestan General Kaufmann to Sher Ali, June 1878. 
Memorandum on the Correspondence between General von Kaufmann and the Ameers Shere 
Ali and Yakub Khan of Kabul. From March 1870 to February 1879, London 1880, No. 30, 
pp. 23–24.
25 Lord Lytton to Viscount Cranbrook, 30th July. C. 2164: Central Asia: No. 1 (1878): 
Correspondence Respecting Central Asia, London 1878, No. 146, Encl. 1, pp. 143–144.
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the arrival of the British mission. The new vakil informed the Emir that the 
mission’s objectives are of friendly nature, but its eventual rejection would be 
considered as an act of hostility.26 The situation got more complicated due to 
the fact that the Emir’s son and heir to the throne recently died, and therefore 
the Emir was still mourning and not want to deal with any state matters. His 
response to the British requests was thus very hostile. “It is as if they were 
come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until 
my officers have received orders from me; how can the Mission come? It is as 
if they wish to disgrace me; it is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will 
tend a complete rupture and breach of friendship”.27
The mission of the Madras Army’s General, Neville Chamberlain, 
nevertheless continued to move to the border. The British, despite their 
insistency, were not admitted to Afghanistan28 to which they responded 
quickly and harshly. On October 30, 1878, the Emir received an ultimatum 
that demanded the admittance of the mission, and also demanded the answer 
by November 20. The Emir did not respond and on November 21, 1878, Great 
Britain declared war on Afghanistan.29 It was the start of a conflict which lasted 
until the beginning of 1878. Today it is regarded, similarly as the First Anglo-
Afghan War, as a great failure. An assessment of its consequences would take 
another very long lecture, but ultimately it met the British goal. The new Emir 
Abdur Rahman by recognizing the Treaty of Gandamak handed his foreign 
policy to the British; Afghanistan could not break free from this state until the 
successful war in 1919.
The conflicts between Great Britain and Afghanistan to a certain extent 
resonate in the Afghans’ approach to the Western influences nowadays. Their 
26 Lord Lytton to Sher Ali Khan, 14th August 1878. PP, C. 2190, No. 49, Encl. 4, p. 232.
27 Telegram from Sir N. Chamberlain to lord Lytton, 17th September 1878. PP, C. 2190, No. 
59, Encl. 7, p. 241.
28 Governor of Khyber province of Afghanistan Faiz Muhammad Khan to Neville 
Chamberlain, 16th September 1878, K. P. DEY, The Life and Career of Major Sir Louis 
Cavagnari, Calcutta 1881, pp. 34–35.
29 Declaration of War, 21st November 1878. BILGRAMI, Appendix 19, pp. 323–327.
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first experience with the Christian civilization sphere was characterized by 
a constant pressure, treachery and inability of understanding on both sides. 
This animosity is present up till now; the evidence can be seen in the Afghan 
Emirs’ attempts to promote the Western influences at the turn of the 1920s and 
the 1930s that fell through at the general animosity toward all Western things. 
The Soviet invasion in 1979 then allowed the rise of the groups that took an 
advantage of the hatred for the Western influences to strengthen their power 
and ruthlessly oppress the inhabitants who did not share their opinion. Also 
the current situation shows how deeply rooted are these attitudes in the minds 
of the Afghans. Taliban is gaining a strong position again, and its return to 
power might be possible immediately after the U.S. troops leave the Afghan 
land.
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